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This article presents a view of India‟s contemporary geopolitical role in Asia, with special emphasis 
on New Delhi‟s relations with China and Russia and various other regional actors, including Iran 
and Pakistan. India‟s approach towards Afghanistan and aspects of Indo-US relations are also 
discussed in terms of Washington‟s current interests and policy direction in South Asia. 
India has been experiencing remarkable economic growth since the onset of the 21st century, albeit 
a slowdown has been witnessed in recent months. By comparison, China maintains a more 
consolidated and sustained growth phase than does India. However, as India is still gaining on 
economic fronts and securing its own geopolitical standing, now is the appropriate time to starting 
asking some questions which will help in understanding the basis for the rise of the newest Indian 
„superpower‟ Several unanswered questions must be closely addressed that will shed light on the 
possible contradictions, paradoxes and obstacles facing the growth of any Asian country, especially 
India 
Many observers believe that the challenges facing India today are threefold. The first is the western-
style economic globalization and whether India can, within this context, maintain its unique 
millennium culture or be subjected to the cultural leveling which is already evident internationally. 
The second challenge is based on geopolitics and international relations. Will India be able to 
maintain a substantially autonomous foreign policy in the new world order? The third problem 
pertains to India‟s internal economic, political and social obstacles that it faces on the chosen path of 
development and whether or not it will be able to achieve superpower status. If India can deal 
effectively with these challenges in the coming years it will be positioned to evolve into a 
superpower; however, there are many factors that may distract from this complete metamorphosis. 
India plays a huge geopolitical role as the sub-continent‟s landmass, lying in the Indian Ocean, is 
located midway between the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca, two crucial economic and 
military points in the geopolitical divide between present and future great powers. From the 
maritime point of view, India‟s geopolitical importance is undeniable, as it can extend its influence 
from the Eden Gulf, located between Yemen and Somalia, to the South China Sea. At the same time, 
due to the vast extension of its land borders, India can even impact political affairs in the Middle 
East, Central Asian, Far East and Southeast Asia. It is the particular geographical location and 
heterogeneous ethnic and religious components that sets India apart from other nations. India has 
consistently tried over time to achieve a great measure of balance between various regional political 
powers in order to serve its own vested interests.The important geostrategic role of India appears to 
be well understood by Washington, Moscow and Beijing, the three major players competing in 
Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region for power, influence and natural resources. Over the past 
two decades China has often perceived India‟s military and economic actions, and its accompanying 
rise, as a threat to its interests, particularly because of India‟s proximity to the South China Sea. 
Because of the rhetoric used by regional countries and the military agreements being mooted 
between India, Vietnam and Japan, this region could become highly-contested and a flashpoint of 
state conflicts. Similarly, the military and economic links developing between India, Australia, the 
United States, Japan and Singapore are perceived in Beijing as means of containing the country of 
the “Rising Sun.” However, the simultaneous emergence of China as a superpower with interests in 
the Indian Ocean and its fast becoming a dominant player in the South Asia and beyond the Asia-
Pacific are negatively assessed by New Delhi. The commercial and military agreements that Beijing 
has concluded with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar and Bhutan, and especially the military 
and nuclear alliance with Pakistan, have been described in Indian circles as attempts by China to 
encircle India. The Indo-Chinese rivalry is often emphasized by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 
and this is echoed in the media and among both Indian and Chinese pundits. However, although 
there remain important differences between the two countries, for example at various points along 
their long mutual border, economic relations and cross border trade between India and China 
continue to be very strong. China is in effect one of India‟s most important trading partners, second 
only to the United States. 
Beijing has changed its perception of India owing to both the increased U.S. presence in Central and 
South Asia Washington‟s potential use of the India‟s impressive economic rise to serve its interests 
in Asia. Sino-Indian relations are now best described as a purely pragmatic economic pact. Such 
pragmatism is at the heart of mutual cooperation in various Southeast Asian regions, as reflected, for 
example, by various potential joint for joint natural gas exploitation and extraction projects with 
Myanmar. 
Aside from such shared interests, China and India are also members of the BRICS, the forum of 
emerging economic powers, alongside Brazil, Russia and more recently South Africa. These 
countries share a common perspective on various global issues: the Arab Spring and accompanying 
riots, NATO‟s intervention in Libya (perceived critically), a hypothetical Western military action in 
Syria and the Iranian nuclear issue. At the same time, however, there remains strong competition 
between them in South and Southeast Asia and, to a lesser extent, in Africa and Central Asia, 
although India‟s penetration into these two last regions is much more recent than China‟s. The 
achievement of a “real peace” between China and India, whose culture have attained a high level of 
mutual understanding throughout much of their long history, would have a positive impact on 
stability in Asia, but also on the world as a whole, given the growing importance and standing of 
these two geographical and demographical heavy weights. 
Another factor to consider is that in the Chinese and Russian perspective India is often perceived 
negatively for having established military and nuclear energy ties with the United States. There are 
different schools of thought in India about a close alliance with the United States, as it is not viewed 
positively in some quarters.There are some discordant points in Indo-U.S. relations.  
The first is India‟s relations with Iran. Although India has also had strong relations with Israel ever 
since the end of the Cold War, especially in military terms, and the Sunni Arab world is in 
competition with Iran in the Middle East, New Delhi wants to keep good terms with Tehran. Still, 
this has not prevented India from expressing opposition to Iran‟s nuclear power program. It 
maintains, however, that this issue can only be resolved through diplomatic means. India has 
consequently stopped exporting some material which could potentially be used by Tehran in its 
nuclear program, a move that is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1,929 of 2010. 
Geopolitical and economic factors account for New Delhi‟s maintenance of good relations with 
Tehran. From a strategic standpoint, an Indo-Iranian alliance could bring about the closing of ranks 
against Pakistan. Pakistan and Iran are potential enemies who need to be kept on the same side, 
especially if Kabul further falls under the influence of Pakistan after the announced U.S. withdrawal 
in 2014. Against this backdrop an alliance with Iran could assume even a greater significance. A 
rising Pakistan would be counterproductive to enhancing India‟s geostrategic interest in Central and 
Southwest Asia. Hence India must stay focused on these regions, not only to satisfy its growing 
energy demand but also to prevent the ex-Soviet republics from forging stronger bonds with 
Pakistan on the basis of their shared Islamic heritage. 
China‟s presence in Iran and the Middles East more generally has also become increasingly 
entrenched over time, and this is increasingly unsettling New Delhi. India considers Tehran to be an 
important transit point in reaching markets in Afghanistan and Central Asia. This is in spite of the 
territorial disputes that India has with Pakistan over Kashmir, a natural and historic cross border 
trading point between Central and Southeast Asia. On the economic level Iran remains, after Saudi 
Arabia, the second largest supplier of oil and it‟s still untouched oil and gas fields represents a 
potential supplier of energy for the fast-growing Indian economy. 
Regional states are in advanced discussions to conclude agreements on opening energy connections 
by sea and/or pipeline. Negotiations on the construction of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline 
project (IPI) are ongoing and only a few obstacles remain to be cleared before the participants are 
able to finalize a deal. 
The very close link between India and Russia is the second major barrier in Indo-American 
relations. In early December 2011, on the sidelines of a meeting between Indian and Russian foreign 
ministers, Moscow and New Delhi expressed their desire to revive the North-South Transport 
Corridor project. An agreement had been signed between India, Iran and Russia to in 2001 to further 
develop the route. One of this project‟s aims is to transport Indian goods by sea, bypassing Pakistan, 
to Iran, from where they would reach Russia‟s southern territories, and possibly Europe, across the 
Caspian Sea. 
The Indian government recently expressed a keen interest in including China and the Central Asian 
states in South Transport Corridor project. Aiming to facilitate trade between South Asia and 
Europe, the Indian initiative would be, on the one hand, in open competition with the US-led “New 
Silk Road” project, designed to build economic and trade bridges between Central and South Asia, 
the Caucasus and Europe, and, on the other hand, with China and Russia‟s plans on their western 
and southern flanks respectively. As to the “New Silk road” project, Iran and “Afpak” operations 
constitute the two main hindrances for its full realization. Nevertheless, India has evinced great 
interests in it, which could complement its own South Transport Corridor project. 
Russia remains India‟s largest arms supplier. Indo-Russian ties are still very strong, a legacy of the 
post-Colonial and the Cold War periods. In addition, they have a common front in the struggle 
against religious extremism. Global Islamic terrorism has hit both Russia and India, and both have 
internal problems with terrorism in the Caucasus and the Kashmir region. This front could 
potentially include China, given the existence of Islamic extremism in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region. The entry of India into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which 
is now being discussed, may also not only result in greater cooperation between Beijing, Moscow 
and New Delhi but change the general geopolitical balance decisively. 
A third pressure point in Indo-U.S. relations is that both countries rarely agree about Pakistan. India 
has consistently criticized the excessive ties between Islamabad and Washington, although in recent 
months the alliance between the two countries has degenerated into an open crisis. India has also 
been very critical of possible dialogue between the U.S., the moderate Taliban and the Haqqani 
network, an insurgent group fighting against US-led NATO forces and the government of 
Afghanistan. To appease India, the White House has asked Pakistan to stop supporting terrorist 
groups along the Durand Line, the porous 2,640 kilometers-long border between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. 
This problem is further linked to Pakistan‟s own “encirclement syndrome” and growing concerns 
over India‟s hegemonic designs in the region. New Delhi welcomes the U.S. presence in 
Afghanistan, including its military bases which are likely to remain after 2014, but is critical of the 
idea of entering into dialogue with the Taliban moderates, fearing a possible return of Pakistan‟s 
influence in that fledgling country. 
Despite the fact that Islamabad sees the recent trade and military agreement between India and 
Afghanistan as a manifestation of a policy of encirclement, in recent months there has been a 
tentative improvement in relations between the two neighbors. An editorial in “The Hindu,” devoted 
to Indo-Pakistan dialogue, referred to the developing relations between India and China as a possible 
model to resolve the border dispute with Islamabad. New Delhi and Beijing are using economic 
opportunities and cooperation between the two gigantic Asian states to smooth out their 
disagreements over borders. Important industrial sectors and social groups of the Indian society are 
calling for dispute resolution and final peace with Islamabad. 
India intends to maintain its own policy towards Pakistan, independent of Washington, on the basis 
of its own vested interests. Islamabad has recently secured most-favored-nation status with India – 
an economic provision deriving from the rules of the World Trade Organization – although there are 
many internal pressures pulling it in the opposite direction. There are small signs of an improvement 
in their relations in general, but there are many problems as well, among which is Islamabad‟s 
failing to respond to Indian requests for it to carry out thorough investigation into the 2008 Mumbai 
attacks and to break Pakistan‟s links with the architect of the attacks, the Lashkar-e-Toiba. 
Pakistan has a Janus-faced political system, with a civilian government on the one hand and the 
Pakistani military and the Inter-Services intelligence (ISI) on the other. The ISI, together with 
radical Islamic groups, have a huge influence on security policies. For this reason, the cards are 
stacked against any possible real progress in relations between the two countries, especially since 
Pakistan negatively perceives India‟s influence in Central Asia and Afghanistan. In addition, a 
definitive territorial agreement with India, and a suppression of internal radical Islamic groups, 
which have undermined the whole region, would destabilize the Pakistani state, as religion provides 
the putty in filling up the social cracks in a country divided by ethno-linguistic groups. 
This possible scenario explains a lot about U.S. engagement with Islamabad, despite a mounting 
number of misunderstandings that recently came to the forefront. The United States tries to stay very 
close to Islamabad for national and international security reasons. Pakistani public opinion is now 
critical of the United States, and, uncharacteristically, this is viewed negatively by India in the wake 
of the warming of Indo-American relations. 
New Delhi is opposed, among other issues, to linking the delicate discussions over Kashmir to the 
situation in Afghanistan, which is part of the American objective of establishing a “Greater Central 
Asia,” and seeks to reduce the importance of nationalism in the region and expresses total 
opposition to foreign interference in regional affairs, as it is adamant about resolving the Kashmir 
issue bilaterally with Pakistan. 
Military confrontation between India and Pakistan is now unlikely, due to the apparent Indian 
superiority in conventional weapons, although this is paradoxically limited by the presence in both 
countries of nuclear weapons. In a sense, possessing a nuclear deterrent is a disadvantage for India. 
It is likely that in the event of a further deterioration in relations, any “military actions” will be 
carried out by radical terrorist groups. 
In recent months a balanced policy appears to have prevailed on India‟s side. This reflects New 
Delhi‟s international affairs approach, that is, the world should be multipolar rather than unipolar 
and, consequently, the problems of Central Asia and South and South-East Asia should be resolved 
at the regional level through cooperation between New Delhi, Beijing, Moscow and Washington. 
India could in fact safeguard the region against regional destabilization and provide a forum for 
continued dialogue between opposing parties. This would be a sensible policy, since the primary 
objective of its policy is to promote its internal security. In fact, not only the Kashmir issue has the 
potential to cause dangerous instability for the Indian state but also religious extremism, especially 
groups operating within the matrix of both Hindu and Islamic separatism in some regions of the 
northeast, and in close proximity with the Chinese border. 
The Maoist Naxalite uprisings in the centre and northeast of India, as well as the desire to gain more 
autonomy in some regions, could further hinder the internal growth of the state and lead to its 
fragmentation. The most visible and well-known case of separatism in recent months is that of the 
Telangana region which is part of Andhra Pradesh state in southern India. The birth of a new 
Telangana state, although it would still be a member of the Indian federation, could coax other 
regions of India to ask for more economic autonomy and sharing of resources, mainly water, as well 
as fanning the flames of the many ethnic conflicts that remain unresolved throughout the country. 
India‟s contemporary geostrategic role does not therefore appear to be overly dependent on the 
United States for maintaining its position as a world‟s leader (although India is a democracy with 
many similarities with Western countries), nor is its role best defined by the loose system of 
alliances established by Russia and China, despite having opened an important dialogue with 
Moscow and Beijing on how best to maintain stability in Central Asia. 
India‟s objective is to then become an independent powerhouse capable of ensuring the stability of 
the Asian continent, whilst maintaining as equidistant a position as possible between the various 
regional and global players. India‟s special geographical location, which is at the crossroads of 
various cultural and religious influences, is connected to this aspiration. Yet another driving force in 
India‟s yearning for a truly independent foreign policy is the rise in recent years of Indian popular 
nationalism. Political authorities are pressured in turn to seek to become an economic and military 
powerhouse in Asia. Such a popular sentiment is a reflection of India‟s leadership within the Non-
Aligned Movement during the Cold War, which meant that New Delhi was neither attached to euro-
Atlantic pole nor to the Soviet camp, despite having been rather close with the Kremlin in its foreign 
and economic relations. 
In an historical epoch in which the area from the Middle East to South Asia is the scene of strong 
competition between different regional and global players New Delhi will need to assess whether 
maintaining substantial autonomy, not only geopolitically but also economically, can be beneficial 
and efficient for the whole India and constitute a proper response to globalization processes inspired 
by the West. 
India‟s role could dramatically change if members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
accept to offer India – and Pakistan – a membership card, an option advocated in recent months by 
both Russia and China, although at the moment New Delhi sees this move as premature. But at this 
stage it is not yet clear whether full SCO membership is in the cards, given the strengthening in 
recent years of economic and military ties between India and the United States. This could 
eventually become an important factor to consider and is certainly a very interesting prospect for the 
eventual normalization of India-Pakistan relations. 
India has a chance to succeed in its contest against contemporary Western-style globalization, given 
the strength of its ancient and rich culture. This is a tough challenge, but the former British colony is 
well-positioned to come forward as a competitive alternative model on the international level. 
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